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Vol. 1 (2025): Philogram Journal for Advanced Philosophical Research

Reconceptualizing Belief as Alief: a case study in conceptual engineering

Submitted
4 August 2025
Published
01-12-2025

Abstract

In this paper, I examine Gendler’s notion of Alief as a case study in conceptual engineering. For this purpose, it draws on contemporary work on the notion of belief. There are certain perplexing phenomena, like being unable to throw darts at our loved one’s face despite knowing that it won’t harm them, that our notion of belief fails to explain. To explain phenomena like this, Gendler introduces a new cognitive state she calls Alief. The introduction of the notion of this state is taken as a case in conceptual engineering. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether it is a successful case of the same. For this purpose, I set out success criteria that involve two conditions a concept must fulfill. These are (1) the demarcation condition and (2) the function condition. Following this, I argue that while Gendler’s case successfully fulfills the first condition, it fails to fulfill the second meaningfully. A method to understand how it can approach the second condition is provided. Following that, I conclude that Gendler’s project could be a successful case of conceptual engineering only on a broader notion of conceptual engineering.

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