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Articles

Vol. 1 (2025): Philogram Journal for Advanced Philosophical Research

Donald Davidson, Conceptual Scheme and Language

Submitted
5 August 2025
Published
01-12-2025

Abstract

Davidson’s discussion on scheme-content dualism has obvious connections with the concept of language. He treats conceptual schema as language to explain his argument. In his later works he discusses the implications of scheme-content rejection on language. However, the theoretical relation between the rejection of the third dogma and his views on language is left unsaid. A coherent account of Davidson’s views on language is also a matter of concern.  Davidson’s claim that there is no such a thing as language certainly becomes puzzling since many of his theories are dependent upon Language. Davidson’s explanation of the correlation between language, belief and action is also discussed here. It is being argued in this paper that Davidson’s views on Language could make sense with Davidson’s account of ontology.  Once this is settled the concept of language can be understood within the context of the rejection of scheme-content dualism.

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